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become prisoners of their own narrative constructions and thus illustrate Jacques Lacan s insight that in paranoia narrative or fantasy acquires the capacity to structure facts. Here the critique of neo-Darwinism emerges once again, if more subtly; the novel's illustration of the ways in which rational faculties can be controlled and directed by fantastic desires serves to undercut the triumphalist aspirations of the neo-Darwinist worldview.
In concluding, I argue that, despite its multifaceted critique of neo-Dar winism, Enduring Love does in fact hold out hope for a rapprochement between the sciences and the humanities. The word from the human biologists bears Darwin out: the way we wear our emotions on our faces is pretty much the same in all cultures, and the infant smile is one social signal that is par ticularly easy to isolate and study. [...] In Edward O.Wilson's cool phrase, it "triggers a more abundant share of parental love and affection."
Not surprisingly, Clarissa the poetry scholar finds such thinking reduc tive:
Everything was being stripped down, she said, and in the process some larger meaning was lost. What a zoologist had to say about a baby's smile could be of no real interest. The truth ofthat smile was in the eye and heart of the parent, and in the unfolding love that only had meaning through time. Children after all play a crucial role in the novel. At the outset, Cla rissa appears to have comfortably adapted to the lack of children of her own with an almost saintly generosity toward "[n]ephews, nieces, godchil dren, the children of neighbors and old friends" (34). But the death of a man named John Logan in the effort to save a child's life has (Joe believes) awakened feelings of loss in Clarissa for the children she has been unable to conceive, as she sees in Logan "a man prepared to die to prevent the kind of loss she felt herself to have sustained" (35). Logan's own children function in the story as surrogate offspring for Joe: his first encounter with them reminds him of the value of his and Clarissa's mutual but endangered love, and they reappear in the final chapter of his narrative as wide-eyed disciples dazzled by the wonder of science that Joe shares with them.10 Indeed this final encounter not only suggests that science might help one appreciate the aesthetic (rather than destroying it) but also hints that Joe is overcoming the "uneasiness" (127) Rationalism gone berserk neatly frames the conflict between obligation to oneself and obligation to another.Yet at the same time his Darwinian perspective allows him to disburden the problem of its moral freight and restore to it some of the "comforting geometry" that belongs to "the knowable, limited plane of the snooker table" (3). Rather than try to assess moral credit or blame for the failure of the rescue (in which John Logan dies), Joe presents moral ity as a mere phenotypic manifestation of an evolved genetic program, "a deeper covenant, ancient and automatic, written in our nature" (15). In his account, all the would-be rescuers, faced with a crisis, are thrown back on a premoral instinct?or more precisely, a clash of instincts, between "cooperation," which Joe describes as "the basis of our earliest hunting successes, the force behind our evolving capacity for language" (15), and "selfishness," which "is also written on our hearts" (15) and which con stitutes the most fundamental of Darwinian motives, survival.
Thus, although Clarissa insists on characterizing Logan as a "good man" (34), Joe tends to see his sacrifice as merely the consequence of an eccentricity in genetic coding; Logan is a man "in whom the flame of altruism must have burned a little stronger" (16). In Joe's neo-Darwinist view, morality in any sense other than self-interest seems to disappear altogether: "Mostly, we are good when it makes sense" (15)?a claim that echoes Michael Ruse and Edward O.Wilson: "Morality, or more strictly our belief in morality, is merely an adaptation put in place to further our reproductive ends" (510). Thus while Joe acknowledges the "horrified shame" (16) and "the nausea of guilt" (35) If such extreme scientism initially makes a reader suspicious of Joe's judgments, it is only as the novel progresses that Joe displays the quality by which Clarissa describes the discourse of evolutionary psychology itself:
"rationalism gone berserk" (74 Joe not only derives immediate financial benefit from marketing neo-Darwinist ideas, he also derives an important secondary benefit: like the primary readership of this genre, and like McEwan himself, Joe Rose is a wealthy white man?a member of precisely that group which has the most to gain (or preserve) by the neo-Darwinist tendency to ratify existing social advantages as "natural." As Louis Menand has written in a critique of neo-Darwinism, "the sciences of human nature tend to validate the practices and preferences of whatever regime happens to be sponsor ing them" (96). Menand continues: "In totalitarian regimes, dissidence is treated as a mental illness. In apartheid regimes, interracial contact is treated as unnatural. In free-market regimes, self-interest is treated as hardwired."15 Such a critique, it should be emphasized, does not reject scientific knowledge but rather calls attention to the potential for biases and blindnesses that render it less disinterested than it purports to be. Our sciences can (and do) serve our own interests, Menand suggests, and he notes that while the biases of scientific discourse may be obvious when we consider a foreign sociopolitical milieu?the Soviet Union, apartheid era South Africa?they are likely to be less obvious when we regard a contemporary Western democracy. But to give the screw one more turn, this very obliviousness to the ways in which our beliefs are entangled with our interests is, ironically, a favorite theme of neo-Darwinism. Joe explains the concept of "self-per suasion," which, he says, is "much loved by evolutionary psychologists": It was pure armchair science, and it went like this: if you had lived in a group, as humans have always done, persuading oth ers of your own needs and interests would be fundamental to your well-being. Sometimes you had to use cunning. Clearly you would be at your most convincing if you persuaded yourself first and did not even have to pretend to believe what you were saying. The kind of self-deluding individuals who tended to do this flourished, as did their genes. So it was we squabbled and scrapped, for our unique intelligence was always at the service of our special pleading and selective blindness to the weakness of our case. The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, unfolds its principal powers in simulation; for this is the means by which the weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves, since they are denied the chance of waging the struggle for ex istence with horns or the fangs of beasts of prey. In man this art of simulation reaches its peak: here deception, flattery, lying and cheating, talking behind the back, posing, living in borrowed splendor, being masked, the disguise of convention, acting a role before others and before oneself?in short, the constant flutter ing around the single flame of vanity, is so much the rule and the law that almost nothing is more incomprehensible than how an honest and pure drive for truth could make its appearance among men.
For Nietzsche, if one begins with the fact of the animal's desire for self preservation, the real problem is not how to account for cunning or de ception?that much is almost self-evident, for "simulation" (Verstellung, perhaps better translated as "dissimulation")17 is the primary function of the intellect, which is itself an evolutionary adaptation on the part of a physically disadvantaged species. The real problem, rather, is how to ac count for the intellect's desire to seek the truth in the first place, "how an honest and pure drive for truth could make its appearance among men." Joe reaches almost exactly the same insight, though with a radically different value judgment; for him, the servitude of the intellect to the instincts is precisely "why metaphysics and science were such courageous enterprises, such startling inventions, bigger than the wheel, bigger than agriculture" (196) .To attempt disinterested knowledge is to overcome a deeply inbred penchant for self-interest and self-deception. But whereas Joe sees such striving as heroic, Nietzsche sees it as merely continued self-delusion. Nietzsche, in sum, invokes evolution not to argue for the supremacy of the human being as a creature more advanced than others (that is, "evolved" in a ideological, non-Darwinian sense), but on the contrary to indict what we could, with only slight anachronism, call the narcissism of the intellect. The intellect so values itself that it forgets its necessary service to the bodily interests that produced it in the first place. As he writes in On the Genealogy of Morals (again using a metaphor from biology):"[0]ur ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit" (16). 
No longer disdaining the value of literary interpretation, Joe now believes that the tortured overreadings of the humanist can save him when his clear-eyed empiricism leaves him in the lurch. Once again, less conscious motives are plainly visible: Joe desires Clarissa herself, her love as much as her skills in reading, and his acknowledgment of the value of her profes sional work becomes a displaced lament for the loss of her love. But Joe, reading Parry's love letters, also needs the ability to make meaning out of incomplete or riddling texts, to supply narrative coherence over and above the empiricist gathering of data.
Thus it is that Enduring Love, for all Joe's discussion of science, con templates, as Childs says, "the stories people tell in order to make sense of the world" (110) and even suggests, at its conclusion, "a common ground for fiction and science in their joint reliance on narrative" (116). But while science surely relies on narrative just as literature does, Joe is
generally suspicious of what he calls "the power and attractions of narra tive" (44), particularly in science. In a magazine article he is writing, Joe links the use of narrative in science to "the nineteenth-century culture of the amateur" (51) and the Victorian novel; as modernism rose in the arts, he argues, so science became the domain of experts and dispensed with storytelling in favor of "hard-edged theories" (52) .Yet he soon recognizes that his own article is also a "narrative in itself"?and furthermore, a "tired one" (51), one in which he does not even believe, and which he eventually discards because "it wasn't science. It was journalism" In other words, for Clarissa and (I would argue) for the novel as a whole, the factual vindication of Joe's triumphalist rationalism does noth ing to negate the significance of his paranoia. Lacan 's famous axiom about the paranoid is wholly applicable here: even if the jealous husband is right about his wife's infidelity, such a fact in no way means that the husband is not paranoid. As Slavoj Zizek writes:
[E]ven if all the facts [the husband] quotes in support of his jealousy are true, even if his wife really is sleeping around with other men, this does not change one bit the fact that his jealousy is a pathological, paranoid construction. (Sublime 48) Such a counterintuitive thesis holds, according to Zizek, because "patho logical jealously is not a matter of getting the facts false, but of the way these facts are integrated into the subject's libidinal economy" (Enjoy 220). For Lacan, in Zizek's words, it is not the facts but fantasy that "gives support to that which we call 'reality'" (Sublime 44). A perfect example of the way in which fantasy so operates is the apocryphal story, told at the fatal birthday lunch for Clarissa, about Keats s visit to, and rejection by, Wordsworth?a story that is said to "tell the truth" even though it isn't "true." Whereas the commonplace reading of this idea would be that lit erature extracts a "higher" truth than history?as Aristotle says, it tells of universal truths rather than particular ones (54)?Lacan's notion is exactly the opposite. For Lacan, the Keats story would be "apocryphal" even if it were true, because it meshes so neatly with the ideological needs of its audience. It confirms a reality that is in the first place structured by fantasy, by story. In this sense, Joe's paranoid knowledge about Jed is wrong even though it is factually quite right?much as Clarissa suggests in her final letter. Such a Lacanian analysis of Joe's pathology, a pathology in which the facts will always confirm the symbolic fantasy structure, suggests de Cl?rambault's syndrome itself, the illness with which Jed is diagnosed. For in de Cl?rambault's cases, we learn, the obsession of the patient is completely invulnerable to any response he or she might receive from the object of the obsession. This invulnerability is what makes Jed's love, according to the case history, "a most lasting form of love" (250) and also what makes it so terrifying. As the case history puts it:
The fact that the object is already married is likely to be regard ed as irrelevant. His protestations of indifference or even hatred are seen as paradoxical or contradictory; her conviction that he "really" loves her remains fixed.
Such an analysis conforms perfectly to Zizek's Lacanian understanding of ideology: "An ideology really succeeds when even the facts which at first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its favor" (Sublime 49 (260) .23 This is not to claim that Joe is every bit as mad as Jed, but to emphasize the continuity between the pathological love Jed feels for Joe and the "normal" love of Joe and Clarissa. One of the more unsettling suggestions of the novel is that love always courts pathology. "De Cl?rambault's syndrome was a dark, distorting mirror that reflected and parodied a brighter world of lovers whose reckless abandon to their cause was sane" (137),Joe thinks, and the psychiatrists Paul Mullen and Mich?le Path? quoted in appendix 1 confirm his judgment: "the pathological extensions of love not only touch upon but overlap with normal experience, and it is not always easy to accept that one of our most valued experiences may merge into psychopathology" (259).Thus appendix 2, in a final gothic flourish, offers the reader a last letter from an institutionalized Jed, a letter that Joe never sees. In this final intrusion of the epistolary on Joe's generally monological narrative, Jed's last, "lost" letter eerily parallels the (apocryphal?) lost letters of Keats so desperately sought by Clarissa. Jed's is the letter that proves to be the "cry of undying love not touched by despair."
Both the rational scientist and the insane religious man can equally become prisoners in their own symbolic constructions. This symmetry does not suggest that science is itself a faith (or any similar vulgarism), but it does imply a critique of neo-Darwinism by showing the ways in which rational faculties can be controlled and directed by fantastic desires.
Lacan s point about paranoia, historically derived from de Cl?rambault's study of erotomania and one of the main topics of Enduring Love, is the priority of fantasy in structuring the way reality is understood.
In this regard, the endurance of Jed's love serves to undermine (once again) the triumphalist aspirations of Joe's neo-Darwinist worldview.
A happy marriage? 10. Joe by the end of the novel is no longer so rationalistic that he can't find a mystical quasi divinity in particle physics. He describes the mystery of the electromagnetic force that holds together a water molecule as "a mysterious powerful force" (243); later in the chapter, another witness of the balloon acci dent says, "These things bind you together, you know" (247 (Davies, Morrison) tend to be suspicious of his Darwinism and his rationality, while others (Childs, Malcolm) 
